| + |
A security issue has been found in Grafana Agent before version 0.21.2. Some inline secrets are exposed in plaintext over the Grafana Agent HTTP server: |
| + |
|
| + |
- Inline secrets for metrics instance configs in the base YAML file are exposed at /-/config |
| + |
- Inline secrets for integrations are exposed at /-/config |
| + |
- Inline secrets for Consul ACL tokens and ETCD basic auth when configured for the scraping service at /-/config. |
| + |
- Inline secrets for the Kafka receiver for OpenTelemetry-Collector tracing at /-/config. |
| + |
- Inline secrets for metrics instance configs loaded from the scraping service are exposed at /agent/api/v1/configs/{name}. |
| + |
|
| + |
Inline secrets will be exposed to anyone being able to reach these endpoints. |
| + |
|
| + |
Secrets found in these sections are used for: |
| + |
|
| + |
- Delivering metrics to a Prometheus Remote Write system |
| + |
- Authenticating against a system for discovering Prometheus targets |
| + |
- Authenticating against a system for collecting metrics (scrape_configs and integrations) |
| + |
- Authenticating against a Consul or ETCD for storing configurations to distribute in scraping service mode |
| + |
- Authenticating against Kafka for receiving traces |
| + |
|
| + |
Non-inlined secrets, such as *_file-based secrets, are not impacted by this vulnerability. |